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What explains the likelihood that an NGO will turn to the courts to pursue their policy goals? 
This article explores the factors that influence the mobilization of law by environmental 
NGOs in four Western European countries. It finds that explanations focused on legal 
opportunity structures are unable to account for the patterns of within-country variation in 
legal mobilization behaviour. The research also shows that bird protection NGOs as well as 
home-grown national environmental NGOs are generally more likely to turn to law than 
transnational environmental groups. While resources and legal opportunities clearly matter to 
some extent, the author suggests - drawing on sociological institutionalist theory - that 
explanations of NGO legal mobilization should a) incorporate an understanding of how 
groups frame and interpret the idea of “the law” and b) explore the role of “strategy 
entrepreneurs” who promote the use of particular tactics within an organization.  
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Nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) around the world are increasingly relying on legal 
tools to influence and enforce public policies across a wide range of fields (Tate & Vallinder, 
1995). Yet it is not always clear why one NGO will turn to the courts and another NGO - 
which works in the same country, on similar issues, in similar ways - will not (Dalton et al. 
2003). Even less is known about why groups which are situated in different legal systems and 
which face different incentives and constraints in terms of mobilizing the law might behave 
in remarkably similar ways in terms of their use of litigation. What then explains the 
likelihood that an NGO will turn to their national courts to pursue their policy goals? 
Addressing this question will help to shed light on debates about whether Europe is 
seeing a rise in levels of adversarial legalism (Kagan, 2007; Kelemen, 2011). Daniel Kelemen 
argues that with the advent of the European Union (EU) there has been a shift in regulatory 
styles in Western Europe; away from consensus politics and opaque networks of bureaucrats 
who develop and implement policy towards “American-style” regulation through litigation 
which relies on lawyers, courts and private enforcement. Much of the debate on whether 
Europe is undergoing this shift has focused on top-down, structural explanations. What has 
been neglected in this debate is the role of micro-level agents, who according to the 
Eurolegalism argument, are the ones pursuing litigation. While some NGOs have embedded 
legal mobilization into their activities, others have not. Kelemen’s work demonstrates the 
breadth of the Eurolegalism phenomenon but does not account for variation across member 
states (Kelemen, 2011: 243). In order to make broader claims about the degree to which 
“Eurolegalism” has spread and shaped behaviour it is crucial to understand how the agents at 
the centre of this argument behave vis-à-vis use of the law (Israël, 2013).   
Answering this question will also matter to scholars of NGO politics. Use of the law 
can have profound implications in terms of an NGOs ability to influence policy change and 
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promote effective enforcement of existing legislation. One branch of previous research has 
argued that the use of legal tools can shift the balance of political power in society and can 
transform marginalized or weak groups into political players capable of challenging policy 
makers and shaping policy outcomes (Alter & Vargas, 2000; Barnes & Burke, 2015; 
Cichowski, 2006; Conant, 2006; Doherty & Hayes, 2014; Epp, 2009; Sellers, 1995; Wilson 
& Rodriguez Cordero, 2006). However, other research has found that the opening up of new 
legal opportunities can have a paradoxical effect: the empowerment of the already powerful 
(Conant, 2002; Galanter, 1974). Tanja Börzel (2006) found that law enforcement mechanisms 
in the EU can increase opportunities for participation by groups, but only if they possess 
domestic court access and sufficient resources to use it.             
These studies have tended to focus on one or two countries and some concentrate 
disproporationately on groups that regularly turn to the courts. As Börzel points out 
“…research on litigation and participation … tends to suffer from a selection bias on the 
dependent variable. Cases in which citizens and groups fail to bring claims … are hardly 
considered” (Börzel, 2006, p. 129). There has been remarkably little systematic research on 
why NGOs situated in the same policy fields and same jurisdictions vary so greatly in terms 
of their reliance on legal tactics. And there have been only a few studies that examine the 
propensity to “turn to law” by similar organizations in different countries (see Epp, 1998; 
Kagan & Axelrad, 2000; Kitschelt, 1986; Morag-Levine, 2003; Sellers 1995). This is in part 
because comparing the effects of law and legal systems is a difficult endeavour: causally 
linking particular features of legislation, legal systems or the characteristics of organisations 
with particular behaviour in terms of legal mobilization is challenging. For example, if 
standing – the right to sue – is limited, if the potential costs of litigation are high and if a 
group has limited financial resources, it is difficult to know which reason (or a combination 
of all of them) exerts a chilling effect on an NGOs’ propensity to litigate. The problem of 
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accounting for the negative result on the dependant variable – choosing not to mobilize the 
law - becomes central in this type of research. 
This article addresses this problem by adopting a multiple country, cross-NGO 
comparative research design which allows for some disentangling of the effects. I analyze the 
legal mobilization behaviour of the key environmental groups in four Western European 
countries: Finland, France, Italy and the United Kingdom. Drawing on the theoretical 
literature on legal opportunity structure (LOS) I derive a series of expectations for which 
jurisdiction we might expect to find more groups that regularly turn to the courts. This body 
of work has shown how the creation of new legal opportunities, the types of rules that 
structure who is allowed to access the court and the rules on legal costs can influence whether 
NGOs decide to mobilize the law (Andersen, 2006; Hilson, 2002; Wilson & Rodriguez 
Cordero, 2006; Vanhala, 2012). Within each country this research examines whether the use 
of litigation is embedded within the activities of the national branches of transnational 
organizations, Greenpeace, Friends of the Earth and WWF, as well as nationally home-grown 
environmental protection associations.   
The research finds that there is enormous variation in how groups respond to legal 
opportunities. It finds, first, that organizations operating in the continental European countries 
examined here that are involved in the protection of birds and their habitats are among the 
most likely in their jurisdictions to rely on legal challenges to pursue their goals. In France, 
Italy and Finland the bird protection organizations and national environmental NGOs were 
identified as regular users of administrative legal processes and saw litigation as a part of 
their normal activities. This is not the case for the Royal Society for the Protection of Birds 
(RSPB) in the UK which is among the least litigious of the environmental NGOs in that 
jurisdiction. Second, the research here finds that the national branches of WWF are 
consistently non-users or low-users of litigation across all four countries. In each of the 
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jurisdictions studied they were identified as one of the groups least likely to turn to the law. 
The pattern among the other groups is more variable. Greenpeace, while generally 
characterized as a non-violent direct action group, has also used legal tactics to some extent 
in some, but not all, jurisdictions. A similarly mixed pattern exists for Friends of the Earth 
with regular use of the courts by the British and French branches and a total eschewing of the 
courts by the Finnish and Italian branches.       
This empirical picture presents a puzzle in terms of existing theory. Accounts that 
focus on opportunities, incentives and constraints that lie at the level of the legal and political 
system offer an important starting point for explaining who mobilizes the law but they are 
unable to fully account for the variation in terms of who turns to litigation. In order to further 
develop theoretical explanations of legal mobilization, this paper develops a set of hypotheses 
and undertakes further analysis to explore the analytical leverage of a sociological 
institutionalist approach –  that focuses on collective action framing processes and the role of 
legal professionals – to address the diverging patterns of NGO litigation behaviour.  
The remainder of the article is structured as follow. The next section presents the LOS 
theoretical approach which focuses on the existence of relevant legal stock, on the degree to 
which standing rules are liberalized and on a legal system’s cost rules. Section three presents 
the research desgin and discusses case selection and methods. Section four draws on 
extensive qualitative data, including more than 60 semi-structured interviews, to explore the 
landscape of environmental legal mobilization in Europe by focusing on cross-organizational 
variation in legal mobilization activity. The findings suggest that while LOS theory offers an 
important starting point, legal mobilization theory should be further developed. Section five 
then turns to sociological institutionalism and derives a series of hypotheses. The plausibility 
of the sociological institutionalist approach is then examined through a qualitative analysis. 
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The paper concludes with an interpretation of the main findings and suggestions for future 
research.  
2. LEGAL OPPORTUNITY STRUCTURES 
Drawing on social movement theory, scholars have developed the concept of LOS to explain 
how the scope of access to justice in a particular jurisdiction impacts on the likelihood of 
groups mobilizing the law (Andersen, 2006; Hilson, 2002; Vanhala, 2012). The focus is on 
the institutional-level constraints and incentives that determine an organization’s ability to 
sue. While different scholars include different variables in their conceptualisations of the 
LOS there is some consensus that the available legal stock, the rules determining legal 
standing and the rules on legal costs all matter (see Andersen, 2006; Evans Case & Givens, 
2010; Hilson, 2002; Vanhala, 2012). 
Legal stock refers to the body of laws that exist in a particular field – from European 
law, to Constitutional law to statutes and regulations. As Andersen notes, “…laws shape the 
kinds of legal claims that can be made as well as the persuasiveness of those claims” 
(Andersen, 2006, p. 12). A major difference between common law countries (such as the UK) 
and civil code countries (such as France) is the role of precedent in judicial decision-making. 
In common law jurisdictions new judicial decisions are constrained by previous ones which 
means that case law makes up a large proportion of the legal stock. Changes in legal stock 
can create or limit opportunities for NGOs to frame their legal claims persuasively.   
Scholars also agree that the regulations that determine who can access the courts – the 
standing rules – also play a crucial role in determining who mobilizes the law and who does 
not (Börzel, 2006; Evans Case & Givens, 2010; Wilson & Rodriguez Cordero, 2006). Rachel 
Cichowski and Alec Stone Sweet (2003) identified a global liberalization of standing rules 
which has influenced the ability of environmental groups in particular to access justice. This 
approach argues that groups that operate in a jurisdiction where the standing rules are 
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liberalized are more likely to mobilize the law than groups that operate in jurisdictions where 
standing is restricted. 
Finally, there is a long-standing literature showing that the ways in which legal costs 
are determined can have an important influence on whether collective actors are willing to go 
to court (Hylton, 1993; Kritzer, 1992). In the US, each party is responsible for paying their 
own attorney’s fees. This system is also in place in several European countries. In the English 
legal system, by contrast, the losing party is responsible for paying the other party’s legal 
fees. This loser-pays system has been shown to have a chilling effect on litigation because of 
the potential of incurring enormous costs (Vanhala, 2012). 
It is important to note that most formulations of LOS theory do not make 
deterministic claims about what NGOs will do in terms of mobilizing the law; instead they 
outline the parameters of what is institutionally possible. LOS theory can offer predictions of 
the following type: when all other things are equal, and where structural constraints and 
incentives in a country favour a particular strategy, that strategy may become more prevalent 
among groups. While some socio-legal scholarship has found that strict restrictions on 
standing or severe cost rules can effectively shut down this avenue of NGO action (Kritzer 
1992), most examples of the application of LOS theory to empirical cases in democratic 
countries explore the nuanced relationship between opportunity structures and NGO action 
(Andersen, 2006; Vanhala, 2011).  
3. CASE SELECTION AND METHODS 
This article undertakes a four country study of legal mobilization in Western European 
countries, with a particular focus on within-country variation. The four countries were 
selected because they offer consistency in terms of the legal stock - as members of the EU a 
large proportion (up to 80 per cent according to some analyses) of their environmental laws 
emanate from the supranational level (Halpern, 2011). They also offer variation in terms of: 
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whether they operate under a common law legal system (the UK) or follow a civil code 
system (the other three); whether they are generally understood to be leaders (Finland) in 
terms of compliance with EU environmental law, whether they are in the middle of the pack 
in terms of compliance (the UK and France) or whether they are laggards (Italy) (see Börzel 
et al., 2010). 
Variation in terms of levels of access to justice on environmental matters is also key 
in the research design. In 1998 the four countries studied here signed (and later ratified) the 
United Nations Economic Commission for Europe Convention on Access to Information, 
Public Participation in Decision-Making and Access to Justice in Environmental Matters 
(known as “the Aarhus Convention”). This international treaty has served as a mechanism to 
encourage improved access to justice on environmental issues across Europe. A systematic 
study conducted in 2007 on access to environmental justice across the then-25 EU member 
states highlighted the similarities and differences between these countries in terms of standing 
rules – who has the right to sue - and cost rules. The findings of this and two other 
comprehensive studies suggest that these four countries offer significant variation in terms of 
their LOS (Darpö 2013; de Sadeleer et al. 2005; Milieu 2007).  
France can be described as having a very open LOS for environmental groups. In 
France any environmental association possesses legal standing, as soon as a decision of the 
public administration has a direct link with its field of activities, and corresponds to its 
geographical scope. In addition, certain associations that are officially licensed by the 
Ministry of the Environment are presumed to have legal standing against any administrative 
decision that is directly related to their objectives. Licensed NGOs can act as a plaintiff in 
instances in which there has been direct or indirect harm to collective interests and a violation 
of any environmental law that these groups have the objective of defending. A unique feature 
of French environmental law is the fusing of civil and criminal processes whereby if a 
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criminal case is being prosecuted a recognized association can join the case as a plaintiff 
(Papadopoulou 2009). In terms of costs there are not only no fees to bring cases but often the 
awarding of damages in a successful case can be financially rewarding for an organization. In 
this way access to justice for NGOs is quite broad.  
Under the Finnish Environmental Protection Act (2000) registered associations or 
foundations whose purpose is to promote environmental, health or nature are generally 
granted access to the courts. In terms of costs the court hearing the case decides who is liable 
for the procedure’s costs and this is based on the assumption that a private party is both 
procedurally and financially at a disadvantage compared to its public counterpart. Generally a 
private party is not held liable for the expenses of a public authority (Milieu 2007). 
In Italy, associations that are officially recognised by Ministerial decree have access 
to the courts. Case law has also increased the possibility for environmental NGOs to 
challenge public authorities’ acts in the name of the protection of “collective interests”. In 
addition, citizens and groups can also participate in the prosecution for offences of 
environmental damage, as an “offended party”. As such they can submit complaints as part of 
the proceedings and make claims for damages. Like in France this has the effect of 
transforming a civil action into a criminal proceeding and the NGO has the right to fully 
participate in the criminal procedure. In terms of costs a loser-pays system is in operation but 
it is common practice in the regional administrative courts for each party to be ordered to 
bear its own costs. 
Finally, the UK is among the least hospitable places in Europe for environmental 
NGOs to access the courts (Darpö, 2013). While standing for NGOs has become more 
commonplace, the loser-pays fee system is a major deterrent for most groups. However, after 
a decade of domestic and international judicial scrutiny there have been a number of slow 
improvements in the rules on costs through the introduction of various cost-capping 
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mechanisms. The Government introduced bespoke costs rules in 2013 for environmental 
cases in order to comply with EU and international law. The costs still remain high, however, 
particularly when compared to the costs faced by NGOs in other European countries. 
Given this comparative landscape, groups in France will find it institutionally easier 
to mobilize the law given the broad access to justice they possess and the financial incentives 
they face in terms of low costs and potential financial rewards. At the other end of the 
spectrum it would be reasonable to expect groups in the UK to be more reluctant to turn to 
the courts because of the huge potential cost liabilities inherent in taking cases in that 
jurisdiction. In the middle are groups situated in Finland, which makes litigation fairly easy 
for NGOs, and Italy where access to justice is broad but the risk of the loser-pays system 
makes it unlikely for groups concerned with resources to take on many cases.     
This article explores the degree to which litigation is embedded in the activities of the 
major environmental NGOs in each country. This involved looking at the national branches 
of the major transnational environmental NGOs (Greenpeace, Friends of the Earth and 
WWF) as well as the main birds protection organisation in each country (Birdlife Finland, 
Royal Society for the Protection of Birds (RSPB) in the UK, Ligue pour la Protection des 
Oiseaux (LPO) in France and Lega Italiana Protezione Uccelli (LIPU) in Italy).1 If the state 
had another large, important nationally-based environmental protection NGO this was also 
included in the analysis. This resulted in the inclusion of France Nature Environnement 
(FNE) in France, Suomen Luonnonsuojeluliitto also known as the Finnish Association for 
Nature Conservation (FANC) in Finland, Legambiente in Italy and ClientEarth in the UK. 
These organisations were identified through a review of the secondary literature on the 
                                                          
1 It is important to note that during the course of research interviews in Italy in autumn 2014 the federation of 
Friends of the Earth International voted to discontinue the membership of Friends of the Earth Italy (Amici della 
Terra).   
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environmental movement and NGOs in each country (e.g. Diani & Donati 1999; Konttinen et 
al., 1999; McCauley, 2007; Rootes, 2003; Nicolino, 2011).  
Focusing on the largest groups in each jurisdiction allows for some control of one of 
the important variables explaining why some groups might rely on legal mobilization more 
than others: resources. Total organizational income for the year 2010 was collected for each 
group from organizational documents or from interviewees where the documents were not 
available. Consistent data on financial resources is difficult to find in terms of cross-
organizational and cross-national analysis so a one-year snapshot of resources is all that is 
shown here. Table 1 presents the data (in euros). 
[Insert table 1 about here] 
A resource mobilization approach claims that organizations must be able to mobilize 
resources successfully in order to pursue collective action (McCarthy & Zald, 1977). The 
extension of this to research on legal mobilization is that financial resources are a necessary 
(but not sufficient condition) for mobilizing the law. In his seminal research Marc Galanter 
(1974) found that the “haves” tend to come out ahead in litigation efforts because of their 
ability to be “repeat players” in the courtroom. Charles Epp found that across common law 
jurisdictions “Combining rights consciousness with a bill of rights and a willing and able 
judiciary improves the outlook for a rights revolution, but material support for sustained 
pursuit of rights is still crucial” (Epp, 1998, p. 17). Epp found that a “support structure” – 
consisting of organizations committed to establishing rights and access to legal and financial 
resources – is a necessary condition for a rights revolution. There is now a broad consensus 
that support structures are central to sustaining legal mobilization efforts (Alter and Vargas 
1998; Cichowski 2007; Conant 2002, 2006, 2016). Choosing the largest and best-funded 
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environmental NGOs in each jurisdiction allows the research design to control for this 
factor.2 
 The main source of data was 60 semi-structured interviews conducted by the author 
and a research assistant across the four countries. Interviewees included executive directors, 
policy and campaign directors for the groups, policy officers, campaigners, volunteer 
coordinators, in-house lawyers, volunteer lawyers and external counsel that worked with 
these organisations.3 Interviews probed the strategies and tactics groups used to pursue their 
goals and asked questions concerning the organization itself, including the degree to which it 
relied on various legal strategies, its relationship with other NGOs both nationally and 
internationally, relationships with government actors and with lawyers. Interviews were 
conducted in English, Finnish, French and Italian and translated to English by the author and 
a research assistant. Data about each organisation’s litigation activity comes directly from the 
interviews and was supplemented by information from the organisation’s newsletters and 
annual reports and secondary literature where these were available. Interviews were coded 
qualitatively by the author.4    
There are two clear limitations with the data used here. First, comparing levels of 
legal mobilization across countries is an almost impossible endeavour. Comparing and 
measuring the number of times groups undertake the process of moving from environmental 
grievance to legal claim to legal case to legal outcome is complex in any single country and 
exponentially so when looking across countries. For this reason the focus of analysis here is 
                                                          
2 The use of overall budget figures is an imperfect proxy for exploring resource mobilization explanations of 
legal mobilization dynamics. This data is used simply to highlight that these groups are relatively well-resourced 
in general terms. 
3 This included interviews with 19 informants in Finland in 2011, interviews with 13 informants in France in 
2011 and 2012, 25 interviews in the UK in 2010, 2011 and 2015 and interviews with 8 informants in Italy in 
2014. 
4 Interviews were coded according to a coding frame developed on the basis of the theoretical explanations 
explored in this article. This was then followed by an analysis using a constant comparison method which 
involved refining categories as the research progressed. This method has the benefit of allowing inductive 
insights from the data to emerge.  
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whether the use of litigation or legal challenges is embedded in the activities of an NGO, 
whether it is incidental in their activities or whether it is completely absent. “Embedded” 
means that the oranization regularly uses litigation or legal challenges as a part of their 
activities, has experience of doing so, takes a proactive approach in terms of using the law 
and understands it as a normal part of what an NGO does. “Incidental” means that the 
organization may have used litigation but it is not a regular part of their activities or strategic 
work, their use of law may have been reactive and in describing what they do, use of the law 
does not feature prominently or at all.  This classification still poses difficulties in terms of 
comparative anlaysis. For example, when legal mobilization is embedded in a Finnish NGO, 
where administrative courts are accessed without a lawyer, where the costs of taking a legal 
case are low and where often there is no hearing, this is very different from a group in the UK 
describing litigation as embedded in their activities where the bureaucratic  hurdles and 
potential cost liabilities of lodging a case are much higher.  
What then can we learn, if anything, from the cross-national nature of this study? 
Some lessons can be gleaned that are helpful in developing theory on when and why NGOs 
might mobilize the law. A cross-national comparison offers some insights into the degree of 
analytical leverage a LOS explanation offers. This research design is not striving to offer a 
definitive test of the theory but rather seeks to offer some insights regarding the boundaries of 
a LOS approach. If in a country, such as France, where groups are offered opportunities and 
strong incentives to mobilize the law, and they choose not to this suggests that other factors 
are playing a very important role. Similarly if in a country like the UK, where the LOS is 
fairly inhospitable, groups are regularly pursuing cases this also tells us that something else is 
going on. Certain types of within-country variation thus can ultimately offer clues about the 
extent to which other factors may be playing a role in shaping legal mobilization propensities. 
This research does not offer a definitive rejection of the theory; the aim is to begin to outline 
14 
 
the conditions under which a LOS may be more or less relevant in explaning legal 
mobilization dynamics. 
A second reason this research design is analytically useful lies in the ability to 
compare the legal mobilization behaviour of different national branches of the same 
transnational organization. The three transnational NGOs examined here, Greenpeace, 
Friends of the Earth and WWF, vary in terms of their international cohesion (with 
Greenpeace acting as a single global organization, FoE as more of a loose federation and 
WWF as a network) and patterns in the legal mobilization behaviour of different branches 
might help to inform theory development in terms of how and why NGOs chose the tactics 
they do.   
A second limitation concerns the reliance on self-reporting regarding the legal activity 
of groups. This is obviously an imperfect measure of legal mobilization propensities. Any 
individual informant may not be aware of all of the activity of the organization or may not be 
aware of historic legal activity. This possibility was explored in the interviews and other 
informants were identified if there were doubts about the extent of knowledge a particular 
informant may have had. A second gauge was asking other organizations within the same 
country which organisations were likely to turn to the courts and which were unlikely to do 
so. This offered at least some informal reputational auditing with which to cross-check the 
self-reported data. Finally, secondary literature on all of these countries was examined to 
validate the findings presented here (e.g. Diani & Donati 1999; McCauley, 2007; Rootes, 
2003; Konttinen et al., 1999; Nicolino, 2011; Vanhala 2012; Vanhala 2016). 
4. LEGAL MOBILIZATION DYNAMICS ACROSS WESTERN EUROPE 
Table 2 presents whether the use of litigation is embedded within an organization’s activities, 
whether it is incidental to them or whether they completely avoid litigation. It categorizes 
groups according to how they reported their involvement in litigation in interviews. The data 
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shows that within each country there is variation in terms of whether litigation as a strategy is 
a regular part of the activity of NGOs. In Finland and Italy there were more groups that 
reported having taken no cases or only a small number of cases but in each jurisdiction there 
was at least one group that did rely on litigation as one of their main tools. In France and the 
UK there was significant variation in terms of whether groups used legal tools. Some, like 
FNE and LPO in France, regularly take legal cases to the administrative courts whereas 
WWF had only taken a small number of cases in that country. In the UK Friends of the Earth 
and Greenpeace were identified as regular litigants and WWF and RSPB were identified as 
relatively litigation-averse. 
[Insert table 1 about here] 
What the data shows is that there are more similarities among groups situated in 
different countries in terms of their legal mobilization behaviour than among different groups 
situated within the same legal-political environment. For example, in each jurisdiction WWF 
was identified as extremely litigation averse. Greenpeace tended to use some litigation but 
not very much in each jurisdiction. All of the home grown national environmental protection 
NGOs had used litigation as a normal part of their activities.  
These findings raise the possibility that perhaps it is organizational perceptions or 
knowledge of the LOS that drove the differences. This was probed in interviews and the 
results generally suggested that groups across jurisdictions have high levels of awareness of 
European environmental law and of their right to access courts, particularly since the 
adoption of the Aarhus Convention.     
In terms of legal stock there was a high-level of awareness about the national and 
supranational legislation relevant to the areas within which these NGOs operate. There was 
consensus among all groups (including the litigation-averse) across all countries that EU 
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environmental legislation was a powerful tool. For example, the Executive Director of the 
Finnish Association for Nature Conservation said: 
[Litigation] is something that has been used more often in the past 15 years 
because it has been so powerful.... and nowadays even better as a result of EU 
membership ... I’m pretty sure that the majority of Finns thought that we would 
be best in class in environmental policies [when Finland joined the EU] but it 
didn’t turn out that way, there were many things that had to be modified. And 
actually nowadays EU legislation represents a formidable instrument for our work 
because we can always go back to existing EU legislation if we notice something 
isn’t being complied with. But I think they have learned their lessons nowadays. 
The Finnish ministries are pretty good about complying... (Interview, FANC, 
September 9, 2011).    
One interviewee from France Nature Environnement noted the extent to which they rely on 
EU environmental law:    
Often, I think that in at least half of our cases we note that something does not 
respect European Community law….We really have mastered European 
environmental law because we know very well that everything flows from that.” 
(Interview, FNE, June 13, 2012). 
An interviewee at WWF Italy expressed similar sentiments but also noted what was generally 
understood to be a significant flaw of the system in Italy: an ability to circumvent.   
The EU has incredibly advanced environmental laws, so the Italian system has 
had to adhere to these. The problem in Italy is the implementation of the law. 
There is of course a growing attention to environmental issues, but also a growing 
attention towards ways to get around legal norms (Interview, WWF Italy, 
November 14, 2014). 
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This was echoed by an interviewee at Friends of the Earth Italy: 
Everyone is ready to praise new developments of environmental law. What 
remains to be established is their coherence, effectiveness and efficacy... Then at 
times laws are applied, yes, but only formally. So there is a new directive, then 
four more years go by before it is implemented and the directive before that one 
hasn’t even been implemented yet. Italy does this continuously (Interview, 
Friends of the Earth Italy, October 15, 2014).  
There was some variation both across groups and across countries in whether groups 
perceived themselves to be welcome in the courtrooms. Some interviewees from French 
NGOs noted the ease with which they can turn to the courts:  
Normally in law you have to show that you suffered a harm, a direct and personal 
harm, which is very restraining. But in France for associations, especially 
environmental protection associations but also consumer associations, for years 
and years we have been able to just say that every environmental infraction, if we 
are an environmental protection organization, causes us indirect harm. And that 
gives us very, very wide access to the judge…but we know we are lucky 
compared to other countries… (Interview, FNE, June 13, 2012). 
Several interviewees in the UK noted that judges have become more favourable to the idea of 
NGOs in the courtroom over the last fifteen years. For example, one lawyer from Friends of 
the Earth noted: 
Judges are more receptive to the importance of having NGOs using the court 
process...whereas before they would think that NGOs had no place in the court 
process... (Interview, Friends of the Earth EWNI, April 13, 2010). 
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Similarly, in Finland, organizations such as Birdlife Finland and FANC were aware of the 
provisions of the Aarhus Convention that enhanced access to justice for associations. One 
interviewee noted 
To access the law is quite new so this legislation [on access to justice] has been 
improving quite fast … But I would say this was a very good thing and positive 
thing… because when the government has cut money and staff from 
environmental departments it often seems that the public interest is taken care of 
by civil society organisations. And also, the number of cases which are nature 
conservation cases have increased a lot. I would say that the societies that have 
been in the court have had good success. They don’t go there easily. They don’t 
complain about everything. They go to complain about the issues that they think 
are wrong and against the law. They have developed nature conservation practice 
a lot. Now when the other parties know that we have access to law it should 
prevent projects and decisions that are against the law. When we have access to 
law, we have more power (Interview, Birdlife Finland, September 9, 2011).  
Italian interviewees were more likely to note the problem of slow timescales of court 
processes than interviewees in other countries. Interviewees noting this problem included 
those from groups that only use litigation irregularly and those that are more often in the 
courts. For example, an interviewee from Greenpeace Italy said:  
We work with legal actions. We present legal complaints to administrative 
tribunals, to the Council of State, to the Presidency. Historically, I must say these 
have been some of our most effective weapons, for a very simple reason: beyond 
the merit of the legal questions we raised, beyond whether our complaints have 
been accepted or rejected, very often we have succeeded. The problem is that our 
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justice system, our civil law system, is rather chaotic, so it causes controversies to 
go on for many years (Interview, Greenpeace Italy, October 7, 2014). 
An interviewee from Legambiente also noted:  
In Italy, I think also compared to the rest of Europe, the world of justice is slow, 
extremely bureaucratised. We do initiate actions with so much energy and 
enthusiasm… (Interview, Legambiente, October 7, 2014). 
The empirical evidence suggests that it is not the LOS nor vastly varying perceptions or 
knowledge of legal opportunities that drive the differences in organizational behaviour.  
5.  EXPLAINING VARIATIONS IN ENVIRONMENTAL LEGAL  
MOBILIZATION: A SOCIOLOGICAL INSTITUTIONALIST APPROACH 
I argue here that accounting for intra-country variation demands further theorization. Recent 
literature has begun to pay more attention to social movement characteristics beyond material 
resources in explaining the choices NGO make in terms of strategic action and tactics. There 
is widespread disagreement, however, about which characteristics matter the most. For 
example, legal mobilization has been explained by: the need for elites to please the rank-and-
file membership (Hansford, 2004; Solberg & Waltenburg, 2006); internal, intergenerational 
divisions over attitudes toward cooperation and conflict with state institutions (Morag-
Levine, 2003); the impact of opposing strategies from adversaries in particular venues 
(Holyoke, 2003); and relations of cooperation and competition within a field of action 
(Vanhala, 2011). All of these approaches could be categorized under the broad umbrella of 
sociological theories of institutions that seek to account for why and when some groups are 
more likely than others to embed legal mobilization in their tactical repertoire. 
In this section I suggest that the literature on sociological institutionalism may be 
useful in addressing the puzzle of why some organizations that have the opportunity to use 
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legal action do not, and why others seem to inherently value legal mobilization as a strategy 
even when faced with significant material and procedural hurdles.   
 Sociological institutionalism, one of the three varieties of “new institutionalism” 
(along with rational and historical counterparts), emerged from organizational theory (Hall 
and Taylor 1996). Sociological institutionalist scholars understand institutions as “systems of 
meaning” based on formal and informal norms, rules, routines, understandings and frames of 
meaning that define “appropriate” behaviour for groups and the individuals within them 
(March and Olsen 1989; Powell and DiMaggio 1991). From a sociological institutionalist 
perspective, organizational “ways of doing” and “ways of knowing” are slow to change 
because they are maintained by actors who “embody and enact” norms and scripts (Lowndes 
and Roberts 2013; McAdam and Scott 2005; Powell and Dimaggio 1991). While there are 
emerging differences within the school of sociological institutionalism regarding the 
relationship between institutions and individual action there is a general consensus that 
institutions influence action through cognitive scripts, categories and models.  
 This article narrows the focus on to two sets of factors internal to organizations that 
may exert pressures that steer an organization’s approach to legal: framing processes and the 
role of epistemic professionals. Although these two factors are undoubtedly related they will 
be separated in the theoretical discussion below for analytical clarity.    
5.1 Framing processes 
Curiously, while political scientists wanting to explain legal mobilization have adopted much 
from social movement theory, they have tended to neglect an important branch of work in the 
field on normative values and framing processes which have come to be considered key 
components in understanding the character and course of social movement organizations 
(Benford and Snow, 2000).  
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Organizational identity and the way in which organizations perceive the world creates 
internal pressures that define the parameters within which decisions about forms of collective 
action are made (Benford & Snow, 2000). For James March and Johan Olsen (1989), 
institutions are interrelated rules and routines that define appropriate actions in terms of 
relations between roles and situations. March and Olsen (1989) use the term “logic of 
appropriateness” to capture the essence of this mechanism based on normative influence: 
organizational norms are “followed because they are seen as natural, rightful, expected and 
legitimate” (March & Olsen 2004: 3).    
   To understand why some groups might pursue strategies, such as legal mobilization, 
even in the face of procedural and material hurdles, I apply this notion of the influence of 
“logics of appropriateness” on tactical repertoires by exploring the potential power of 
meaning frames on decisions to engage with the law. Building on Erving Goffman’s concept 
of a frame as a “schemata of interpretation”, David Snow and Scott Byrd argue that the 
framing perspective views actors not merely as promoters of existing ideas and meanings but 
as “signifying agents actively engaged in producing and maintaining meaning for 
constituents, antagonists and bystanders” (Snow & Byrd, 2007, p. 123). Framing processes 
shape which issues are seen as problems, which are discussed, which are taken up for action 
and, important for this research, which forms of action are seen as most appropriate (Smith, 
1998; Vanhala, 2011). A collective actor’s framing processes may have an influence on the 
type of strategy they will choose in trying to shape politics and achieve change. The tools of 
frame analysis allow us to capture the process of the attribution of meaning that indivdiuals 
give to symbols, events, behaviour and discourse (Goffman 1974). 
If this argument is theoretically sound we would expect to see that groups are more 
likely to rely on legal mobilization when their identity and framing processes define “law” as 
an efficient and morally acceptable target of action and when they see the courts as an 
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appropriate venue within which to pursue their policy goals. Conversely, if an organization’s 
hegemonic ideational frames do not conceptualize the “law” or courts as legitimate targets or 
venues it seems unlikely that they will be regular and active participants within judicial 
venues.      
Hypothesis 1: Groups that frame the problems they seek to address and/or the 
constituencies they serve through a legal lens will be more likely to rely on 
litigation. Groups that are sceptical of law and/or do not understand the 
constituencies they advocate for primarily as rights holders will be less likely to 
have litigation embedded in their tactical repertoire. 
Evidence about organizational framings of law can be found in groups’ public documents and 
in the private statements of organizational insiders. If framing matters then groups which see 
a strong legal framework as an important part of addressing environmental problems will be 
the ones more likely to turn to the courts. Frame analysis can be used to probe how 
campaigners and lawyers have understood and then acted upon their organization’s 
conception of the law and what the environmental legal framework offers. 
5.2 Strategy Entrepreneurs 
Sociologial institutionalist explanations have recently been accused of devoting too much 
attention to the ways in which the institutional ideational environment influences the 
behaviour of individuals. By placing so much emphasis on the role of cultural conventions, 
norms and cognitive frames, sociological institutionalism has been criticized for removing 
human agency too completely from the process (Peters 2005). A recent turn in new 
institutionalism focuses on the role individuals can play in shaping organizational structures 
and meaning frames. For example, some recent work by sociological institutionalists has 
focused on mimesis; the idea that in a context of uncertainty and limted rationality, 
institutions have a tendency to imitate one another (Peters 2005). This is thought to occur 
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mostly through the migration of professionals from one organization to another (Saurugger 
2013). Individuals are able to form and reform organizations: particular categories of 
indivduals can shape organizations and their tactical repertoires.  
Different sub-disciplines in the social sciences have conceptualised the role of these 
types of micro-level agents in a variety of ways. For example, international relations scholars 
who study the diffusion of human rights tend to talk about “norm entrepreneurs” - those 
agents who advocate for different behaviour with the hope of playing a catalytic role in norm 
emergence or norm change (Finnemore and Sikkink 1998).  Others, particularly those who 
study international environmental politics, have emphasized the role that knowledge-based 
experts – epistemic communities –  play in diffusing ideas, framing issues for debate and 
proposing specific policies or strategies. Peter Haas defines an epistemic community as “a 
network of professionals with recognized expertise and competence in a particular domain 
and an authoritative claim to policy-relevant knowledge within that domain or issue area” 
(Haas, 1992, p. 3). In the field of socio-legal studies, scholars have pointed to the role of 
“cause lawyers” in social movements to account for the turn to legal mobilization: the 
existence of in-house lawyers or relationships with pro bono legal counsel may help to 
explain a group’s propensity to litigate or may influence the meaning frames of a group and 
increase the likelihood of a group framing problems through a legal lens (Edelman et al. 
2010; Epp, 1998; Israël 2014; Lejeune 2011).  
Bridging these three bodies of work on norm entrepreneurs, epistemic communities 
and cause lawyers, I introduce the term “strategy entrepreneurs” here to describe those agents 
who may play a role in introducing new tactics into an organization’s repertoire and 
promoting the use of particular strategies, such as legal mobilization. It is hypothesized that 
those organizations with relationships with lawyers will be more likely to use legal tools. 
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Hypothesis 2: Groups that have relationships with lawyers will be more likely to 
mobilize the law than those without connections to legal counsel. 
If the role of strategy entrepreneurs matters in explaining legal mobilization we should be 
able to assess this by tracing the relationships organizations have with lawyers and the nature 
of those relationships. This can include in-house lawyers and/or close relationships with 
external lawyers and/or the existence of volunteer networks of lawyers. 
In their empirical work, sociological institutionalists tend to undertake in-depth case 
studies of specific organizations and use interpretive methodologies to produce “thick” 
descriptions of subtle and dynamic processes by which institutionalized norms influence 
repertoires of action over extended temporal scales (Lowndes and Roberts, 2013; Morag-
Levine, 2003; Vanhala, 2011). Covering a number of organizations across four countries 
means this paper cannot offer the type of in-depth analysis that has been characteristic of 
previous approaches in a single article. However, the breadth of coverage in this paper is an 
important contribution in terms of understanding the analytical leverage of a sociological-
institutionalist approach across multiple cases.  
6. EVIDENCE 
This section uses the theoretical framework developed above to explore the empirical 
evidence.  
6.1 Framing processes 
Hypothesis 1 suggests that a group’s framing processes will influence the likelihood that they 
will use litigation: if a group views the problems they seek to address as legal ones we would 
expect them to be more likely to turn to the courts than groups that might be skeptical about 
law. The cross-national/cross-organizational pattern does suggest that framing processes 
matters to some extent in explaining the propensity to mobilize the law.  
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 Across all four countries two consistencies across organizations emerged. WWF was 
seen in all of these jurisdictions, both internally and externally, as a group that is litigation-
averse because of its culture which is perceived as conservative and oriented towards 
corporations. Said one participant from the organization in France: “WWF is not an 
organization that wants to undertake a lot of litigation. For at least the last ten years the object 
has been to undertake nature protection programs” (Interview, WWF France, June 7, 2012). 
According to one lawyer that had interacted with the group in France, the organization at one 
point considered increasing its use of proactive litigation: 
So, WWF recently, in about 2003… asked themselves “would it not be in our 
interest to use the law proactively?” So they began to do it slowly and now I can 
say they have stopped completely. This policy of using law was stopped almost as 
soon as it had started… It’s not their culture in fact… (Interview, environmental 
lawyer, June 14, 2012). 
Interviewees in Finland tended to characterise WWF in remarkably similar terms.  
WWF is more… close to decision-makers and policy-makers… they want to be 
more approved… They don’t want to argue and they don’t want to be openly 
disagreeing…. So when other groups are cutting off cooperation [with 
government or corporate actors] WWF are still trying to find some compromise 
(Interview, Birdlife Finland, September 9, 2011).  
A second cross-organizational pattern emerged from the interviews. Greenpeace’s 
framing of the law was also fairly consistent across the four states studied here. The 
organization can be described as having a sceptical orientation towards the law and what can 
be achieved by relying on the legal framework (though this was not totally consistent across 
states). It differs from the other organizations discussed here in that it is often engaged in 
criminal law processes after non-violent direct action protests. Greenpeace’s reluctance to use 
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the law pro-actively has been attributed by several research participants to the culture of 
action within the organization and the time scales of justice. For example, one participant in 
France noted that in Greenpeace: “There is a mistrust of judges. In general the justice of men 
is too slow: it’s not adapted to the climate emergency, to the ecological emergency” 
(Interview, environmental lawyer, June 14, 2012). 
An interviewee in Italy echoed these sentiments: 
Let’s say that it isn’t part of the rhetoric of Greenpeace that of inviting people to 
respect the law. It’s not our method……I would say that environmental law at 
times is only a fig leaf covering dirt. For example, when we denounced harmful 
emissions by the coal plant in Vado Ligure, the company defended itself saying it 
had always respected legal emission limits. So obviously there is a problem with 
those limits, which caused damages to health and environment. Environmental 
law is something that at times is best to be suspicious of… (Interview, 
Greenpeace Italy, October 7, 2014). 
Thus the hypothesized relationship seems to be stronger for some organizations than 
others. However, an inductive insight that emerged from the data was the framing of the 
relationship between civil society and government and how this shaped attitudes towards 
legal action. This was particularly prevalent in two of the jurisdictions. Interestingly, 
interviewees in both Italy and Finland highlighted the fact that a perceived inability to 
participate in policy-making pushed them to the courts. In Finland the problem was identified 
as a long history of consensual politics 
[Use of the law] is something that has been used more often in the past 15 years 
because it has been so powerful. In a country like Finland where most of the 
decisions are based on consensus, a civil society organization like ours would 
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have no role whatsoever if we couldn’t threaten decision-makers and the people 
in power with legislative instruments (Interview, FANC, September 9, 2011). 
Nowadays the Court seems to be our only friend. I’m very happy that in the 
courts there is still a place for objective rulings (Interview, Birdlife Finland, 
September 9, 2011). 
In Italy it was the lack of participatory mechanisms that was seen as a reason to turn to the 
courts.  
[In response to the question do you take legal actions?] Yes, very often. Very 
often. It is an activity that, unfortunately, in Italy is overused. This goes back to 
the fact that when politics are not as transparent as they should be, when its 
relations are not as participative as they should be, action through courts often 
becomes necessary (Interview, LIPU Italy, October 24, 2014). 
Finally, interviewees from Greenpeace in several countries described what they saw as 
the occupation of civil society by the state or political organizations:    
The thing is that in Italy there is no well-defined line between civil society and 
politics. Historically, here political institutions have worked to occupy civil 
society … This means that there have never been really independent 
organisations. We [Greenpeace] - because we are a non-Italian reality, as in we 
were born and raised in a global network and shaped by the Anglo-Saxon culture 
- have limits, boundaries that are very strict when it comes to our independence. 
We are a non-party organisation. We really are. This is our strength and our 
weakness (Interview, Greenpeace Italy, October 7, 2014). 
This was also noted by an interviewee at Greenpeace Finland who argued that “Civil 




What the interview data suggest however is that perceived exclusion from political 
decision-making can be a prompt for groups to turn to courts. Interestingly, it does not seem 
to matter whether this exclusion exists in a very transparent political system (such as Finland) 
or because of the lack of transparency and access to legislators (such as in Italy). In both of 
these countries groups have framed their decision to turn to the courts within a broader 
rhetoric of exclusion from decision-making.     
Another aspect that differentiated organisations was how they saw the use of litigation 
fitting in with democratic processes. For some, their was a strong framing of “access to 
justice” as a key tenet of democracy. For example, in their promotional material Friends of 
the Earth (across countries) and some of the national organizations rely on this framing when 
communicating with their memberships and the broader public.    
Going to court to defend the environment where a law has been breached is a 
form of participation which citizens should be encouraged to undertake, albeit as 
a last resort…The benefit of more open access to the courts comes from improved 
decision making by public authorities, who know that their decisions can be 
challenged. (Friends of the Earth Scotland, 2011, 6). 
To deal with the ecological crisis and against harm to the environment, we are 
deploying all the tools of democracy, from consultations to legal action. Each 
year, France Nature Environnement defends the interests of the environment in 
more than a hundred legal cases (FNE Website, 2016). 
For a small minority of interviewees there was much greater skepticism about what 
democratic ideals mean in terms of mobilizing the law. For example, one interviewee in Italy 
noted: 
I do get that at times some issues can only be solved through court action, but we 
would like to avoid that, both because the Italian justice system is in a pitiful state 
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and because it is a careless way to do politics (Interview, Friends of the Earth 
Italy, October 15 2014).  
In short, framing theory is useful in accounting for the behaviour of two of the 
transnational groups examined here but cannot account for the overall picture. The identity of 
WWF as an organization that does not use law in an adversarial way was consistent across 
countries. Interviewees from within and outside the organization regularly pointed to it as a 
group whose culture jarred with the use of litigation. Similarly, there was a relatively 
consistent framing among interviewees in Greenpeace’s various branches that the law was 
not an effective tool and the organization, based on this interview data, can be described as 
being sceptical about the extent to which a legal framework alone can offer effective 
protection of the environment. In contrast with this, interviewees in the home-grown national 
environmental protection organizations and the various branches of Friends of the Earth were 
much more likely to express (implicitly or explicitly) faith in what the legal framework can 
offer in terms of environmental protection. 
6.2 Strategy entrepreneurs 
This research finds limited support for hypothesis 2 that suggests that groups that have 
relationships with lawyers will be more likely to mobilize the law. Table 3 summarizes the 
access each organization has to legal expertise. There was a good degree of variation in terms 
of the amount of legal staff in-house within each country and some patterns across countries. 
NGOs in the UK had more lawyers in-house than any of the other countries. One UK 
research participant noted:  
A decade ago, very few NGOs had in-house lawyers – now most of the large 
NGOs do. This may have improved the quality of legal advice received – or at 
least have secured improved access to legal advice! (Personal Communication, 
WWF UK, April 12, 2011). 
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At the other end of the spectrum are the Finnish NGOs which do not have any in-house 
lawyers. 
We are the organization that does that [take legal challenges]. But we don’t have 
our own lawyer unfortunately. It’s something that we really miss at this stage. 
Fortunately in some bigger issues we have been able to find partners that have 
been able to help us with that. So both at the national level and at the EU level we 
have been active. In raising complaints, taking complaints and going all the way 
to the court (Interview, FANC, September 9, 2011). 
The more effective work is done through the Courts. We have to go to the Courts 
more often because nothing happens without it. So I think environmental societies 
should have more lawyers (Interview, Birdlife Finland, September 9, 2011). 
[Insert table 3 about here] 
Across countries Greenpeace did not have an in-house lawyer in any of the countries 
studied but all of the interviewees from the organization pointed to a long-standing 
institutionalized relationship with a lawyer or several lawyers within their jurisdiction. Often 
the cost of in-house legal staff was seen as prohibitive. For example, a Greenpeace 
interviewee in Italy noted:   
It’s a problem of costs. Having a limited budget, we need to verify whether it’s 
more convenient to have an internal lawyer as part of our staff, or if from time to 
time we consult lawyers who are already familiar with our work….Usually, when 
we face administrative appeal, there is already a lawyer involved, who’s probably 
from the place in which the administrative proceedings take place, who knows the 
issue and is specialised in that issue. We have a couple of lawyers we know who 
do that (Interview, Greenpeace Italy, September 30, 2014). 
A former Friends of the Earth lawyer in England made a similar point. 
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Different campaigners had different ideas about how law could help...I also acted 
quite proactively, gave them information… The big issue was cost...the downside 
of losing a case is that you lose money and you have to think whether the money 
could have been spent better elsewhere (Interview, former Friends of the Earth 
EWNI lawyer, April 22, 2010). 
Though in some jurisdictions this was changing. Greenpeace France, for example, 
argued that perceptions about when to use the law were changing.  
Greenpeace has evolved a lot in the last ten years: previously legal action was 
perceived as supporting direct action protests. A lawyer intervened only when 
activists were arrested and prosecuted. Today legal action is seen as an 
advantageous campaign tool in achieving concrete results (Greenpeace Magazine, 
2006, 14) 
Finally, the lawyers that were interviewed across organizations tended to see themselves as 
having to be proactive and “reach into” campaigns rather than sit and wait for campaigners to 
come to them.  
I find that we [the lawyers] really play a driving role on use of the law. For 
example, there is legislation and we know that concretely it’s not being 
enforced… So we say, “ok here is a priority, we’re going to enforce the 
legislation. It’s not necessarily going to be someone from one of our thematic 
campaigns that calls on us to do it. It’s up to us to have our own ideas (Interview, 
FNE, June 13, 2012).   
It all depends on the character of the individuals and organisations......it all 
depends on the campaigners...if they can see how their objectives can benefit 




ClientEarth, in the United Kingdom, was the only group examined that is made up mainly of 
lawyers. They saw this as differentiating themselves from other UK groups in a fundamental 
way.  
Because law has not been used a lot by the other groups...and hence it comes last 
in the thought process...I am exaggerating here...but the other groups always start 
with politics... and then bring in law later on...We look at problems in the world 
and think of the best way to deal with these problems using law… This is a major 
difference between us and other organisations...And this is the idea...to develop 
tremendous in-depth expertise and to be able to work on the whole cycle of the 
law...from its inception to working in Parliament...to implementation and 
enforcement...the latter stages are really not focussed on by other groups...they 
focus more on getting law enacted...and for lawyers enactment is just part of the 
process...for us implementation and enforcement are equally important 
(Interview, ClientEarth, April 22, 2010). 
The findings here are inconclusive in terms of whether having in-house legal staff, an 
institutionalized relationship with an external lawyer or a large network of volunteer lawyers 
makes a group more likely to mobilize the law. What this data does suggest is that groups 
have found a number of ways to access legal advice, even when their financial resources are 
limited. Future research could develop this approach by exploring the nature of the 
relationships more closely and by exploring whether having a legal professional in leadership 
roles within organizations might be influential in increasing an organization’s propensity to 
litigate.     
CONCLUSION 
How can we explain why some NGOs turn to the courts as a part of their political 
campaigning whereas others eschew the use of this tactic? According to existing literature the 
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likelihood of mobilizing the law is influenced, but not determined, by the rules that shape 
who is allowed to go to the courts, the existence of relevant law, the financial incentives and 
constraints to going to court and the availability of resources to do so. The research presented 
here offers a complementary picture.  
In each of these jurisdictions there were organizations that regularly use legal tools to 
to challenge policy decisions. This may not be surprising for a case like France, where the 
incentives clearly encourage groups to go to the courts. However it is surprising that many of 
the groups in the UK, where there are significant cost hurdles to mobilizing the law, regularly 
turn to the courts. The interview data also showed that variation in legal mobilization 
behaviour was not driven by differences in knowledge or perceptions of the legal opportunity 
structure. The large majority of the groups interviewed here had high levels of awareness of 
EU environmental law and of the improving opportunities to turn to law. 
The findings here suggest that a sociological institutionalist perspective is a helpful 
complement to existing legal mobilization theoretical approaches but alone it also fails to 
account for the patterns observed. The frame analysis suggests that for WWF and Greenpeace 
there is at least some relationship between these organizations’ worldview and culture vis-à-
vis “the law” and their tendency to avoid the use of this tactic. Surprisingly, the existence of 
different forms of relationships with lawyers did not seem to have a direct impact on levels of 
legal mobilization activity. In some cases, groups without in-house legal counsel were the 
most litigious in their jurisdiction, in other cases groups with in-house lawyers, such as 
WWF, were very unlikely to go to court. In France and Italy the national environmental 
NGOs, FNE and Legambiente respectively, possess extensive decentralized networks of 
lawyers which may help to explain why the use of legal action is embedded in their tactical 
repertoires. In short, the findings here suggest there is no straightforward relationship 
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between the role of legal professionals within an organization and their likelihood of 
mobilizing the law. 
All of this suggests that there is not one overarching theoretical branch that can 
account for legal mobilization dynamics both across and within countries. This research has 
played an important role in expanding the spatial horizons of legal mobilization research; 
future research should strive to also expand temporal horizons (see e.g. Morag-Levine, 2003). 
This would help us understand how, for example, the historical record of litigation success 
and failure might influence legal mobilization dynamics within an organization. Scholars 
could also move towards developing a synthetic theoretical framework that takes both 
contextual factors and agent-level characteristics seriously and explores the interaction 
betweens them to account for legal mobilization behaviour across countries, across groups 
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